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Abstract: The paper proposes a novel way in which social constructivism and 
rationalism might be combined in the study of the EU´s external relations. It pro-
ceeds in four steps: First, a basic model for the study of EU external policies is 
introduced, with its four basic elements being based on different combinations 
of constructivism and rationalism. Second, existing theories are categorised in 
accordance with the model. Third, a case study exploring the relations of three 
countries in the EU´s Eastern neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) with 
the Union is introduced, through which the practical applicability of the model is 
demonstrated. Fourth, the paper concludes with some theoretical remarks.
Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy, EU external policies, social 
constructivism, social rationalism
Introduction1
The debate between rationalists and constructivists remains one of the defi ning 
theoretical axes in the fi eld of international relations as well as that of European stud-
ies. A number of scholars have explored the key points of discord between the two 
approaches (for instance, Katzenstein 1999; Pollack 2000; Finnemore 2001; Lezaun 
2002). But the fi rst phase of constructivist theorizing, which focussed primarily on 
metatheoretical issues, made a deeper engagement between constructivism and ra-
tionalism diffi cult to achieve. Only slowly, with the “descension” of the constructivist 
research to the systematic analysis of empirical questions, a more fruitful dialogue 
between the two approaches became possible (one of the fi rst attempts at this was 
made already in 1999 in the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 
dedicated to constructivism in European studies). Those trying to bring the two ap-
proaches closer together have so far employed two strategies: The fi rst is that of (1) the 
“bridge-builders”, who aim at a comprehensive synthesis of the two approaches, typi-
cally (a) by proposing a via media that encompasses elements of both rationalism and 
constructivism (Adler 1997; Wendt 1999) or (b) by using one of the approaches to at-
tempt a hostile takeover of the other approach, which usually means interpreting one of 
1 This publication is fi nanced by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (research grant no. 
407/08/1741, Social Constructivism and the EU´s External Relations: The European Neighbour-
hood Policy).
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the approaches as part of the other (e.g. Müller 2004; for the original discussion about 
the (im)possibility of a synthesis, see Keohane 1988; for a critical assessment, see 
Wiener 2003).2 The second is that of “opticians”, who believe that the two approaches 
should be seen rather as “analytical lenses” that help us to see particular aspects of the 
world of international politics without necessarily proclaiming that the other lenses are 
just blindfolds (for the clearest formulation of this, see Fearon –Wendt 2005).
Both of these strategies suffer from serious shortcomings. For the bridge-builders, 
the most serious of these diffi culties lies in the fact that they usually treat the two 
approaches as grand theories that include not only empirically grounded claims 
about international politics but also a number of philosophical assumptions that 
pertain to philosophy of social science, which go far beyond the traditional study 
of IR. This means that the theoretical synthesis at which they aim would have to 
include a synthesis of their ontologies (and possibly also epistemologies), which is 
obviously hardly conceivable. This explains why bridge-builders are so interested 
in metatheory: it is metatheoretical concerns that are the biggest stumbling blocks 
on the way to a theoretical synthesis of the two positions.
Another, perhaps more promising line of enquiry is to take rationalism and con-
structivism as analytical lenses that can be applied or taken off by the analyst as 
the differing empirical contexts require. The decision about their usefulness and 
compatibility is thus dependent only on the empirical analysis and not on their 
metatheoretical presuppositions. Even though this position is less widespread in the 
study of international relations, some scholars have convincingly argued in favour 
of this approach (Checkel 1998; Jupille et al. 2003; Fearon – Wendt 2005) and tried 
to specify conditions for the types of cases in which one or the other approach is 
more suitable (Checkel 1997; Zürn – Checkel 2005).3
Yet the weakness of these accounts – as innovative as they may be – is that by 
delimiting the scope conditions for each of the two theories they keep them sepa-
rate. While bringing the two approaches closer together as two alternative research 
instruments, they nevertheless insist that when exploring a particular case we have 
to choose one or the other, or at least break the case study down into two or more 
sub-studies, each of them with their own rationalist or constructivist framework. 
So, even though these scholars may not be interested in the metatheoretical ques-
tions and allegedly aim at a synthesis at the level of methodology, they do not 
2 We are aware that the metaphor of bridge-building may be seen as imprecise since the “bridge-
builders” often aim at a take-over of the alternative position rather than at creating a forum for 
discussion with the other positions. In spite of these diffi culties, we would like to stick to this label 
since it is widely used in the literature (see the references above).
3 Cf. also Checkel´s comment that “at present, constructivism is, like rational choice, nothing more 
than a method.” (Checkel 1998: 342) 
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merge the two approaches as one would expect, but rather focus on the “questions 
of scope and domains-of-application”, as Checkel argues (Checkel 2005: 805).
This cardinal problem can be demonstated by referring to the above-mentioned 
text by Fearon and Wendt (2005). The authors distinguish between three types of 
choices of rationalism and constructivism: metatheoretical, methodological, and 
empirical. Their preferred option being methodology, they are convinced that “ra-
tionalism and constructivism are most fruitfully viewed pragmatically as analytical 
tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of the world” 
(the emphasis in the original). On the one hand, the rejection of the choice based 
on philosophical considerations is a clear rejection of the bridge building approach, 
which in itself is puzzling given the previous position of Alexander Wendt on the 
issue. However, the rejection of the empirically-grounded choice is even more 
troubling. If we choose the methodology fi rst and only then approach the empirical 
world in order to conduct our analysis, we will not be able to be really pragmatic, 
choosing the method applied as the empirical analysis requires. In addition, by the 
preference for the methodological choice over the empirical one, Fearon and Wendt 
reject the very possibility of combining the two methods in one study since this 
would imply the dependence of the choice(s) on the empirical research.
We argue that these scholars are inconsistent here and that is why our approach 
is somewhat different. Like Fearon and Wendt, we believe in the possibility, or 
even the desirability, of pragmatism in the choice between the two approaches. 
Unlike Fearon and Wendt, however, we are convinced that this pragmatic choice 
must be ultimately based on the empirical situation to which our analytical tools 
are applied. Once we deny the necessary connection between the empirical and our 
methodological choice, we can no longer talk about pragmatism. Our rejection of 
the necessity to opt for one or the other alternative methodology in advance also 
opens up the possibility of combining the two approaches in each of the cases. 
Indeed the strategy of the bridge-builders is not a fruitful one – and we should give 
up the illusion of a grand theoretical synthesis encompassing a unifi ed ontology 
of international relations. While the strategy of the opticians is better equipped for 
a pragmatic synthesis of rationalism and constructivism, it nevertheless also suffers 
from a major fl aw since it often severs the vital link between the methodological 
choice and the empirical fi eld.
Our approach stresses the pragmatic, empirically grounded choice of rationalism 
and constructivism, or even a combination (or several different combinations) of 
the two. Hence, we believe that in many case studies, the “division of labour” 
among the two approaches needn´t be defi ned in advance, but that it will rather 
follow from the empirical research. This opens a new, so far rarely trodden path 
of research which can show not only when a particular actor employs the more 
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utilitarian or normative mode of reasoning and acting, but also how and under what 
conditions this actor moves from one mode to the other or how it is possible that 
some actors may behave in both modes simultaneously, depending on their social 
roles in different international settings.
It is important to stress here that the method discussed here does not mean a con-
crete methodology (such as structured elite interviews or content analysis). In this 
sense, our position is again similar to that of Fearon and Wendt, who claim that, for 
instance, the assumption of exogenous preferences is a methodological convenience 
(2005: 53), even though the assumption clearly does not translate into any concrete 
methodology. What we mean by analytical lenses is that after our careful empirical 
study, we declare an actor rationalist or constructivist based on its concrete actions, 
which we study, even though we are fully aware that no actor is purely rationalist 
or purely normative. That is why we call our ideal-typical generalisation and the 
simultaneous neglect of other features of the actor “analytical lenses” instead of 
claiming that our labels fully exhaust and capture the “real” characteristics of the 
actor.
In our study, we will proceed in four steps: First, focusing on EU foreign policy, 
we will introduce our model, which offers four different combinations of rational-
ism and constructivism. Second, we will show that most existing theories explain-
ing the EU’s relations with its neighbours that would be diffi cult to defi ne as purely 
rationalist or constructivist fi t nicely into our model. Third, we will introduce our 
empirical study, which explores the relations of three countries in the EU neigh-
bourhood (Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) towards the Union. In this way, we 
will shed more light on the dynamic dimension of our model. Fourth, we will draw 
some theoretical conclusions from the case study.
Constructivism and rationalism: Four models of EU external relations
Before presenting our model, we should defi ne the two “isms” that we are trying 
to combine. Indeed, the number of defi nitions of the two is very high and still grow-
ing. Alexander Wendt defi nes the two basic tenets of constructivism as “(1) that the 
structures of human associations are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.” (Wendt 1999: 1) 
Other scholars agree; some of them come up with strikingly similar defi nitions. Jef-
frey Checkel, for instance, defi nes constructivism as “an approach to social inquiry 
based on two assumptions: (1) the environment in which agents/states take action 
is social rather as well as material and (2) this setting can provide agents/states with 
understanding of their interests.” (Checkel 1998: 325)
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Other theorists are very critical of the mainstream interpretation of constructiv-
ism, which is summed up in the two defi nitions above. Stefano Guzzini, for in-
stance, is adamant in insisting that “constructivism... is epistemologically about 
the social construction of knowledge, and ontologically about the construction of 
social reality” (the emphasis in the original), thus implying that the marriage of US 
mainstream constructivism with positivism is a mistake that overlooks a large part 
of what constructivism really is – a position that relativizes many of the positivist 
knowledge claims. Another critical point often raised by opponents of mainstream 
constructivism pertains to the role of language in social constructivism, which plays 
no role whatsoever in the works of Alexander Wendt. Yet it is exactly language (and 
the related linguistic turn), as they argue, that lay at the roots of social constructiv-
ism in international relations. For Nicholas Onuf, one of the founding fathers of 
constructivism in IR, language plays a central role in the approach: “On ontological 
grounds, constructivism challenges the positivist view that language serves only to 
represent the world as it is. Language also serves a constitutive function. By speak-
ing, we make the world what it is.” (Onuf 2002: 126)
The problem with the defi nition of rationalism may seem easier since unlike con-
structivists, rationalists usually do not label themselves as such (except when en-
gaging in metatheoretical debates) and instead identify themselves with particular 
substantive theories such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. But in fact 
the problem of defi nition is even more complex here – rationalism is a very broad 
category that includes (1) theories stressing the rationality of actors as their main 
defi ning feature (contrasted to theories that defend irrational or normative motiva-
tions for action), (2) approaches that prefer material over ideational factors, and 
also (3) a host of theories which start from the assumption of methodological (or, in 
some cases, ontological) individualism (contrary to approaches that stress the role 
of structures in social life). It is obvious that theories that are rationalist in the fi rst 
sense do not have to be rationalist in the second, etc. As a result, we are confronted 
with a large number of widely different approaches, all of which can be classifi ed 
as rationalist in some sense. This is the reason why Fearon and Wendt claim that 
“as used in IR context, ‘rationalism’ seems to refer variously to formal and informal 
applications of rational choice theory to IR questions, to any work drawing on the 
tradition of microeconomic theory from Alfred Marshall to recent developments in 
evolutionary game theory, or most broadly to any ‘positivist’ exercise in explaining 
foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behavior.” (Fearon – Wendt 2005: 54)
Given the problems related to the multiplicity of defi nitions of both constructiv-
ism and rationalism, we tried to defi ne both of them in a way (1) that would be 
clearly identifi able as connected with one of the two approaches, (2) that would 
not endanger our strategy, dragging us into metatheoretical issues that are not our 
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concern here, and (3) that would be, at the same time, suffi ciently specifi c so as to 
allow an empirical analysis contrasting one of the approaches to the other. Hence, 
constructivism as we will discuss it here is rather narrowly defi ned as the conviction 
that ideas matter and that the basic behavioural mode of social actors is rule-fol-
lowing. To rephrase the defi nition somewhat differently, actors´ (intersubjectively 
constructed) identities require compliance with internalised norms irrespective of 
whether these norms bring these actors additional benefi ts or not.
Rationalism, on the other hand, is defi ned as the conviction that social actors try 
to maximise their self-interest (which may be both material and ideational) and 
that they rationally manipulate their environment (which may be both material and 
ideational) to reach their ends. This implies that while rationalism is based on the 
actors´ ability of self-refl ection, leaving more space for agency, constructivism is 
more sceptical regarding this ability, and tends to take on more structural features. 
However, we should be quick to add that this in no way means that rationalism and 
constructivism constitute direct opposites in the agency-structure debate (Wendt 
1987; Hopf 1998) since constructivism can (and in our case, it indeed does) focus 
on actors as well, particularly if their normative environment is changing. For in-
stance, the still thriving research on the Europeanization of national bureaucracies 
and policies in EU member states is a clear case in point since notwithstanding 
the importance of the normative structure represented by the European Union, the 
major focus is clearly on the attributes of the actors (member states, sub-state bu-
reaucracies and institutions, etc.)
The distinction between constructivism and rationalism that we introduced here 
comes very close to (but is not entirely identical with) the Weberian notions of goal-
instrumental (zweckrationales Handeln) and traditional actions (traditionelles Han-
deln). While the fi rst kind of action is refl ective and purely instrumental, and its aim 
is the maximization of the actor’s own utility, the traditional action is rule-oriented, 
either in the form of unconscious compliance with customs and traditions or in the 
form of an explicit yet still irrational acceptance of a (social, cultural, or religious) 
norm (or norms) as the guiding principle of one´s behaviour. Since the former is re-
fl ective and the latter is not, Weber sometimes differentiates between “action” (Han-
deln) as the appropriate label for the fi rst and “behaviour” (Verhalten) for the second.
Although we believe that this defi nition of rationalism and constructivism is 
widely acceptable to the adherents of both streams, it nevertheless brings to the 
fore some problematic features of the representation of all social action in this 
simplifi ed dichotomy. Weber himself operates with two more types of social action: 
value-rational action (wertrationales Handeln) and emotional action (emotionales 
Handeln). A value-rational action is an action that has a fi xed goal which is ration-
ally followed. However, the goal itself (which may be transcendental/religious, 
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broadly ideological, or purely material) is not questioned. The means applied to 
reach the goal can be rationally chosen but their negative side-effects or inappro-
priateness (or immorality) can never outweigh the positive value that is attached to 
the desired goal.
It is tempting to assume that if the European Union as an actor in international 
relations behaves in the “constructivist” manner we have just described, the same 
is automatically true for its external partners. Yet there are numerous examples of 
studies which show that the external partners often do not respond in the same way 
but rather try to promote their own very differently defi ned interests. This pertains 
to the ties between the EU and the US (Kagan 2002), EU-Russia relations (Krato-
chvíl 2008) and many other relations. In other words, it is often the case that we are 
not presented with a unifi ed world – be it purely constructivist or purely rationalist, 
but a world in which different actors employ different behavioural modes.
The four combinations of rationalism and constructivism in the study of the relations 
between the EU and its external partners can be shown in a simple table (Table 1).
Table 1: The four combinations of rationalism and constructivism in the study 
of the relations between the EU and its external partners
 External country
European Union Normative actor Rational actor
Normative actor Strong constructivism Weak constructivism
Rational actor Weak rationalism Strong rationalism
The fi rst position is that of “strong constructivism”. Here, both the EU and the 
external actor are essentially rule-followers and their behaviour is directly linked 
to their (potential or actual) identities. Cooperation and confl ict between the two 
are interpreted as a parameter of the proximity and compatibility of their identi-
ties. A number of theories of EU actorness operate within this framework. The 
most conspicuous example is “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002). Man-
ners purges any signs of instrumentality from his approach and sees the relations 
between the EU and its partners in purely normative terms.4 Neither the EU nor the 
partner countries calculate whether the “transference” of norms brings them some 
further benefi ts (op. cit.: 2045). In other situations, the EU sets a “virtuous exam-
ple” that is followed by others for normative reasons (Coombes 1998). Another 
group of theories that belong to this category are those which present the difference 
between EU´s policies and those of the other actors in terms of norms and identity. 
4 For the time being, let us leave aside the fact that Manners in fact focuses on just one side of 
the equation, i.e. the EU´s infl uence on the partners, hence sidelining the opposite effect of the 
partners upon the Union.
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For instance, there are multiple studies which cast the misunderstandings between 
the EU and its partners (United States, Turkey, Russia and others) in normative 
terms (Kratochvíl 2008).
The second position is labelled “weak constructivism”. The European Union as 
the principal focus of these kinds of studies remains a normative actor whose ac-
tions are based on its norms and values. The partner country accepts the normative 
nature of the EU but tries to manipulate EU norms to its own advantage. In these 
accounts, the EU is sometimes presented not as an actor but rather as the normative 
context in which rational actors are situated, using EU norms to increase their own 
benefi ts. As a result, in “weak constructivism”, the interpretation of the EU as an 
overarching structure and of states as rational agents comes closest to the agency-
structure debate (see above).
One of the many examples of such an approach is the concept of rhetorical action, 
which is defi ned as “the strategic use of norm-based arguments” (Schimmelfennig 
2001: 48). In other words, the external partners (in this particular case the EU mem-
bership candidates) understand that the EU is a community of norms and values, 
but they themselves are external rational actors who can convince the EU to agree 
with the enlargement by reference to the EU´s own principles and past commit-
ments. In other words, while the EU is forced to comply with its norms, the external 
partners are seen as normatively unconstrained egoists. A different approach, but 
still within the bounds of weak constructivism, is the one that marks the debate on 
EU-US relations (e.g. Cooper 2002; Kagan 2002). Although the accents among the 
scholars who partake in the debate differ, they all depict the EU as a norm-ruled 
community that seldom uses physical force, whereas the United States is described 
as the typical modern state that devises rational strategies to maintain international 
order and its own stance on the top of the global hierarchy.
The third type, weak rationalism, is the symmetrical opposite of weak construc-
tivism. The situation which it describes is seemingly less common – the EU is the 
rational actor that uses its infl uence to change the behaviour of its external partners. 
However, the apparent scarcity of theories based on this approach is quite mislead-
ing. In fact, a substantial part of the literature on Europeanization in candidate and/
or neighbour countries of the EU is based exactly on this model. The European Un-
ion carefully chooses those norms and principles to whose adoption priority should 
be given, in particular during the accession negotiation processes (cf. for example, 
Ágh 1999), while the candidate states often comply due to their eagerness to belong 
to the community as soon as possible. Others argue that the same principle applies 
to the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is seen as the EU´s rational strategy 
of coping with those who long for EU membership but are unlikely to reach their 
objective any time in the near future (cf. Smith 2005).
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The fi nal position is that of strong rationalism, where institutions are seen as 
rather irrelevant and all actors pursue their own interests. Constraints stemming 
from the normative environment are easy to overcome, and sometimes their impact 
is denied altogether. Hence, a better relationship with the EU or even an EU entry 
is not seen as benefi cial per se, but only if it brings additional benefi ts such as free 
trade, greater investment, higher security, infl uence over strategic decisions of larg-
er states, etc. Strong rationalism can adopt the form of a host of liberal theories or, 
in more extreme cases, realist accounts of EU external relations. Examples of the 
former would be the civilian power concept (Duchêne 1973; for a critique, see Bull 
1982) or the liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation of the enlargement process 
(Moravcsik – Vachudova 2003). Here, both the EU and the partner countries are 
rational utility-maximisers, and both believe that their relations are based on shared 
interests and mutually benefi cial interdependence. Realist accounts of the EU´s 
relations with its partners are also embodiments of strong rationalism. For instance, 
Grieco´s voice opportunity thesis tries to explain the small states´ reasons for desir-
ing EU membership without relying too heavily on normative factors (even though 
Grieco acknowledges some role for the integration institutions) (Grieco 1995).
The main aim of our attempt to bring together the four combinations of con-
structivism and rationalism in a single model is twofold. First, we want to show 
that our model is comprehensive enough to accommodate most existing theories 
of EU external relations. In other words, these theories could be seen as particular 
instances of the four clusters of theoretical approaches. This allows us to see the 
implicit yet essential connection between different theories, say Schimmelfennig´s 
concept of rhetorical action (as an example of weak constructivism) and the study 
of Europeanization (as an instance of weak rationalism). Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, our aim is to show that our theoretical analysis does not have to be 
confi ned to a single quadrant but that a theoretically informed empirical study can 
show how a bilateral relationship between the EU and an external partner moves 
from one position to another. This is something none of the above-described theo-
ries are able to explain since each of them is built on a single logic of action.
We are aware of the fact that our model has its limitations as well. First of all, 
it depicts four different situations, but their interconnections are not further de-
veloped in our model. As a result the transition from the position of, say, strong 
constructivism to weak constructivism is not explicitly defi ned, and the decision 
about when the shift from the former to the latter takes place must be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, weak constructivism and weak rationalism are 
identical on the theoretical level. In both cases, one actor prefers a normatively-
driven behaviour while the other is rationalist. Our distinction, however, is relevant 
in the study of EU external relations. There are substantial differences between the 
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situation of a normative EU and a rationalist external actor (weak constructivism) 
and that of a rationalist EU and a normative external actor (weak rationalism). The 
difference is important not in the least due to the fact that in weak constructivism, 
norms are usually much more important than in weak rationalism since the EU 
provides a general normative setting, in which the other, rationalist actor (Ukraine, 
for instance) operates.
Case study: The European Neighbourhood Policy
Research design
To demonstrate the usefulness of our model, we have explored the relations of 
three countries of Eastern Europe towards the EU in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). We focus on the ENP for three reasons: First, the 
academic study of the ENP has been marked by the all-pervading dichotomy of 
values vs. interests (Haukkala, 2005), which precisely refl ects the theoretical dis-
tinction of constructivism vs. rationalism that we introduced and modifi ed above. 
Second, the unifi ed approach of the EU towards all the partner countries partici-
pating in the ENP (or at least its Eastern dimension) can be contrasted with the 
potentially very different interpretations of the policy by the partner countries. As 
a result, we may get a more varied picture than if we just focussed on one particular 
bilateral relation. Third, the Policy has been evolving very quickly and it is possible 
that the changes of the Policy will correspond with the shifts of the relations from 
one of the four theoretical quadrants to another.
Three countries were chosen from among the ENP partner countries in Eastern 
Europe - Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Our motivation for this choice was 
twofold: First, these countries represent both countries enthusiastic about the ENP 
(Georgia) and the strongest critics thereof (Ukraine), both the originally proposed 
partners (Ukraine and Moldova) and the latecomers (Georgia), and both big part-
ners (Ukraine with more than 46 million inhabitants) and small ones (Georgia and 
Moldova have slightly more than four million inhabitants each). Second, while 
some countries indicate that the only objective for them is full EU membership (in 
particular Ukraine), the others do not stress the accession as the only option, which 
might indicate a different approach to the EU (possibly a more utilitarian one).
We used two complementary methods. The fi rst was a series a semi-structured 
one-on-one elite interviews with 16 offi cials of the three countries (cf. Creswell 
1997; Burnham et al. 2008, particularly the chapter on elite interviewing). In seven 
cases, these offi cials headed EU departments at the national ministries dealing with 
European integration (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of European In-
tegration and the Ministry of Justice). In fi ve cases, they were members or advisors 
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of parliamentary committees dealing with the EU. The interviews did not focus on 
the substance of the countries´ relations with the EU, but rather on the procedural 
aspects. Altogether, our standardized questionnaire covered nine broad themes. For 
instance, one important question pertained to the ways through which agreements 
were reached (unilateral imposition, arguing, negotiations with concessions from 
both sides, etc.). Also, questions about motivations for pursuing deeper integration 
with the EU were asked. The answers ranged from those related to identity and 
normative concerns to those related to material benefi ts for the country. The inter-
views were followed by e-mail communication, clarifying some topics that were 
not suffi ciently discussed during the interviews.
While the fi rst method, interviews, focussed on the partner countries, the second-
ary method briefl y explored the EU side of the equation. We carried out a content 
analysis of the key documents published by the European Commission concerning 
these countries and the ENP as a whole. The time span these documents cover is 
2003–2007. We used Atlas.ti software for the qualitative analysis, which enabled 
us to code and cross-analyse a huge amount of data that we would not be able to 
process using the traditional method of manual coding. In particular, we explored 
the allusions to values, interests and the related logics of consequences and logics 
of appropriateness (March – Olsen 1998).
Research fi ndings
The most important information, which was repeatedly stressed in almost every 
interview, was the shift in the partner countries´ approach to the European Union 
from the politics of identity (the wish to “join Europe”) to the politics of pragma-
tism (the wish to gain benefi ts). When the ENP was fi rst drafted (at that time, it 
was titled “the Wider Europe Initiative”), the countries included in it took a wary 
stance towards it. Their main concern was that the objective of the policy might 
be an avoidance of further enlargement. This perception was particularly strong in 
Ukraine. As one interviewee insisted, “the policy was created to keep Ukraine out” 
(interview 1), and the ENP was largely perceived as “an alternative arrangement 
to enlargement” (ibid.). Even though the policy offered some substantial economic 
benefi ts (the most visible of which was the proposed creation of the so-called deep 
free trade area), Ukraine was very critical of the policy and insisted on its right 
to become an EU member. To express this seeming paradox in theoretical terms, 
Ukraine rejected the offer of economic benefi ts since it felt that its European iden-
tity and aspirations were being denied and that these material benefi ts were offered 
to deprive Ukraine of its rightful place in the fold of the EU.
The position of Georgia substantially differed from that of Ukraine. Georgian 
offi cials did not complain about the policy as loudly as the Ukrainians did since 
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Georgia was happy that it was invited to join the policy, even if only after the 
Rose Revolution of 2003. Yet even Georgia did not escape problems with “the 
common reading” of the policy (interview 2). Georgia also expected the policy to 
pave the way towards its EU membership and cared a lot about catching up with the 
other countries, for instance, by demanding a three-year Action Plan instead of the 
originally proposed fi ve-year one. To sum up, both those who were unhappy about 
the policy (Ukraine) and those who welcomed it (Georgia and Moldova) were vir-
tually obsessed with the EU membership in the fi rst phase. Ukraine rejected the 
policy because it feared that it would decrease its chances of an early EU entry, and 
Georgia and Moldova accepted it since they, on the contrary, believed that it would 
speed up their progress towards the full membership. All of them clearly saw the 
membership as primarily related to their European identity and shared values, i.e. 
in the constructivist terms.
As indicated above, the stress on shared values and a common identity was grad-
ually replaced by the more pragmatic stress on common interests. But what were 
the reasons for this unexpected “pragmatic turn”? Most importantly, the European 
Commission, in spite of its original value-laden rhetoric, indicated from the very 
beginning that the partner countries´ infl uence on its decisions was very limited. 
When the interviewees described the discussions about the bilateral Action Plans, 
the most common phrase was “take it, or leave it” (interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). 
Several interviewees confi rmed that the European Commission insisted that the 
discussions about the Action Plans should not be called negotiations, but consul-
tations (interviews 2 and 6), thus further decreasing the infl uence of the partner 
countries over the fi nal shape of the documents.
Surprisingly, the frequent meetings between the offi cials from the European 
Commission and the interviewees led simultaneously to the interviewees´ Europe-
anization and their diminished attention to EU membership. The mutual “psycho-
logical adjustment” (interview 7) meant that both the partner countries and the EC 
“learned their lessons” (interview 2), and the partner countries realized that they 
had to “listen more carefully to Brussels” (interview 7). The resulting tendency 
in all three analysed countries was that shared values retreated to the background, 
and technical and administrative cooperation started to occupy a prominent place. 
As one interviewee from Moldova put it, “we want higher standards, like those in 
the EU, but the European perspective is not attainable now, and so we focus on 
pragmatic small steps leading there” (interview 5).
If we rephrase our fi ndings in terms of different logics of action (March and 
Olsen, 1998), the logic of appropriateness that was so greatly stressed by the partner 
countries at the beginning slowly gave way to the logic of consequences. When the 
interviewees were asked about the difference between the original motivation for 
Politics in Central Europe.indd   33 8.7.10   11:26
34
Constructivism and Rationalism as Analytical Lenses: 
The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy
Petr Kratochvíl
Elsa Tulmets
participation in the policy and the current objectives, the membership retreated to 
a position of a hardly attainable vision, or at best a long-term goal. Instead, nearly 
all of the attention of the countries is focussed on creating a free trade area, facili-
tating visa procedures, energy cooperation, administrative and judiciary reforms, 
phytosanitary standards, etc. (interview 8). To put it simply, instead of membership, 
the relations of these countries with the EU are “all about bringing regulation” 
(interview 7).
Next to the logic of consequences embodied in the focus on “common interests”, 
the logic of arguing also appears (cf. Risse 2000). However, unlike in the Haberma-
sian concept of communicative rationality, the logic of arguing as described by the 
interviewees only pretends to create an environment of equality in which all argu-
ments are rationally weighed and the following action is based on the consensual 
conclusion. Here, the European Commission does indeed allow for open discussion 
about all issues but these discussions have no visible effect on the Commission´s 
proposals. As one interviewee bluntly put it, the offi cial “bilateral documents are 
purely EU internal documents” (interview 3). According to the majority of the in-
terviewees, the Commission´s open approach aims only at placating “the public 
and the diplomacy” (interview 5) but it does not have anything to do with the way 
the Commission prepares its documents.
Despite this negative assessment of the Commission, the same institution is sur-
prisingly seen as the best ally of the partner countries. The interviewees claimed 
that notwithstanding its unilateral approach, it is “doing more for us than our best 
friends among the member states” (interview 6) or that the Commission is “on our 
side against the member states”. Obviously, the Commission succeeded in convinc-
ing the partner countries that the red lines regarding enlargement or visa facilitation 
are imposed upon the Commission by the member states, whose interests it has 
to balance out. In other words, again the main thrust of arguments about why the 
Commission behaves in this rather restrictive way is not related to the asymmetry 
in symbolic power between the Commission and the countries, but to the internal 
balance of interest in the EU.
Although our case study focuses primarily on the position of the partner coun-
tries, we also made some research into the position of the European Commission. 
The additional method we used here was content analysis. We focused mainly on 
the four strategic papers released by the European Commission (see below). We 
analysed four types of action here: (1) conditionality as a strategy transferred to the 
ENP from the enlargement process; (2) the logic of consequences related to ration-
alism; (3) the logic of appropriateness related to constructivism; and (4) the logic of 
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argumentation.5 In terms of coding, the four logics were related to different phrases 
used in the documents: conditionality was tied to those kinds of expressions that 
boil down to “if country A fulfi ls obligation B, then it will receive reward C from 
the EU”; the logic of consequences was related to expressions containing references 
to “interests”, “advantages” or “utility” and the like; the logic of appropriateness 
pertained to allusions to values, norms, and principles; and the logic of argumenta-
tion pertained to calls for discussions on an equal footing, deliberation, the efforts 
to fi nd a consensual solution, etc.
Figure 1: The graphical result of our analysis
The graphical result of our analysis (Figure 1)6 reveals three main fi ndings: First, 
it is clear that the logic of appropriateness and the logic of conditionality have 
steadily disappeared. While in the fi rst analysed document, these two types of action 
constituted two thirds of all the cases, their presence decreased to approximately 
42 percent in the 2007 paper. Conditionality is a typical instrument used in the 
enlargement process, and references to the concept abound in enlargement-related 
documents. The gradual vanishing of conditionality is, on the one hand, certainly 
related to the dislike of the term by the partner countries and the subsequent at-
tempts of the European Commission to replace it with the less controversial term 
“benchmarking”. Yet on the other hand, it also shows that the relations have been 
moving towards the more pragmatic focus on trade cooperation.
5 Although it could be argued that conditionality is not an autonomous logic on par with the other 
three, we are convinced that due to its importance in both the enlargement process and the EU´s 
relations with its neighbourhood, it deserves to be treated separately.
6 The graph used here is also a part of Petr Kratochvíl and Ondřej Horký (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) Nothing is Imposed in this Policy, Institute of International Relations, Prague.
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Second, the importance of the other two logics, that of argumentation and that 
of consequences, has been continuously growing. This supports our fi ndings from 
the interviews. The argumentation and consultations were identifi ed as the key ele-
ments of the relations between the European Commission and the partner countries. 
At the same time, the argumentation served either to inform EU offi cials about 
the complaints of the partners or to convince the partner countries to accept the 
Commission´s proposal. It almost never happened that the argumentation would 
lead to a substantial shift in the position of the EC. One possible explanation was 
the dependence of the EC on the stances of the EU member states when each of 
them draws several red lines (for instance, concerning the visa-free travel, trade 
in sensitive goods and services, agricultural products, etc.). Another explanation, 
complementary to the fi rst, lies in the clearly perceived asymmetry between the 
EC and the partner countries which were forced to comply with the Commission´s 
views irrespective of its tendency to ignore the partners´ critique.
The gradual replacement of the constructivist, normatively-oriented rhetoric with 
the rationalist argumentation based on self-interest and egoistic utility maximi-
sation is also refl ected in the increase in the reliance on argumentation based on 
consequences. This also pertains to the last change, which started to take place 
only after 2004. From the fi rst to the second document, the share of the logic of 
appropriateness remained more or less the same, and the frequency with which con-
ditionality was invoked even increased. This means that in the fi rst two documents, 
the European Commission also stressed the role of common values and identity. In 
the fi rst, it even discussed the matter of enlargement (not ruling out these countries´ 
accession in the long term). Yet, in the following years the Commission´s posi-
tion moved towards a more utilitarian orientation on common interests. Given the 
Commission´s institutional power and its infl uence on the policy-makers in the 
partner countries, in the end it succeeded in persuading the partner countries that 
they should adopt a more pragmatic stance too.
Conclusion
Although some traces of the constructivist mode of behaviour remain (such as 
using the term “European perspective” as a synonym for EU accession – interview 
3), the change of the countries´ behaviour towards the EU is hard to miss. The talk 
about pragmatic cooperation focussing on common interests carries the day. The 
mutual relations have thus evolved in three phases: First, in the phase of strong 
constructivism from around the time the ENP was born, both the EU and the part-
ner countries stressed the cultural similarities and the ideational factors that drew 
them together. In the second phase, weak rationalism, the European Commission 
changed its approach, stressing cooperation rather than integration and interests 
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rather than values. The partner countries, however, resisted this change for some 
time and tried to convince the EU that the original stance, which was more favour-
able for accession, should be preferred. This was refl ected in the critical attitude 
towards the ENP (particularly on the part of Ukraine) and the persistent conviction 
that all the material benefi ts the policy can bring to the partners cannot offset the 
symbolic and normative importance of membership. Nevertheless, in the end the 
European Commission convinced the partner countries that due to the existence 
of “red lines” imposed by the member states, the membership goal should not be 
pursued or that the pursuit should be put off for an unspecifi ed future moment. 
Instead, both sides dedicated all their attention to gaining material benefi ts from 
their partnership – be they stability, security, trade and limited migration as the 
main benefi ts for the EU, or incentives for domestic reforms, regulations and trade 
opportunities for the partner countries. In other words, the fi nal phase was that of 
a strong rationalism, with both sides aiming at a maximization of their benefi ts.
Our case study also shows that within the relatively short period of time of the 
policy´s evolution, multiple changes in the relationship between the EU and its ex-
ternal partners were possible. Interestingly, the stronger actor (in our case, the Euro-
pean Commission) has been able not only to infl uence the normative orientation of 
the weaker partners, but also to induce a shift from the normatively-grounded policy 
to the interest-driven approach. This fi nding has three corollaries: First, while some 
strategies of the external actors like the rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig 2001) 
might have worked in the past, it is highly improbable that such a strategy would 
work again, as the case of Ukraine amply demonstrates. It is no longer possible 
to shame those Union members who oppose further enlargement since the shift to 
the “common interests” approach debilitates any normatively based argumentation. 
In terms of membership perspective, the situation of the current partner countries 
today and the Central European post-Communist countries at the beginning of the 
1990s are similar at fi rst glance. Both groups of countries fought vigorously for 
the full membership in the EU, which was, in both cases, resisted by an infl uential 
group of EU member states. However, while the rhetorical action was instrumental 
in gradually overcoming the negative stance of some EU member states to the 
enlargement in the 1990s, this strategy is doomed to fail today as our study shows.
Second, our case study suggests that the commonly held view of the arena of in-
ternational relations as being either of the constructivist or the rationalist type is 
misleading. Instead, it is useful to explore the motivations of particular actors indi-
vidually since their approaches may be very diverse. While the general orientation of 
an international actor is quite stable and hence switches between the rationalist and 
the constructivist modes of operation will be rare, particular bilateral relationships 
may be changing pretty frequently, possibly with every change of government.
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Finally, we believe that this study opens up space for more research on various 
combinations of the rationalist and constructivist types of action. For instance, it 
would be interesting to explore to what extent individual countries (such as France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland, to name just a few interesting cases) in 
the EU tend to one or more of these ideal types.
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